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I have always been somewhat perplexed about the
mechanisms of politics and more specifically, the agents of
political participation.

With no reservations at all,

spit out those magical words,

I can

III am a Conservative".

However, trying to explain why becomes excruciatingly
painful.

I would rather reply that I am ignorant of politics

altogether than try to articulate the formation of my
beliefs.

Nevertheless, it is a question that has peaked my

interest for years and one I am determined to answer.
it that some people vote and others do not?

Why is

What is

partisanship in politics and why is it so important?

How is

socialization important in formulating ones beliefs?

These

are some of the questions I will try to answer today.

I am

genuinely convinced that in trying to decipher why people
vote the way they do it is important to fully understand the
idea of partisanship and build on that.

So with that in mind

let us plunge into the partisan voting practices of the
United States Congress.
Congress' passage of the January 12 1991 resolution
authorizing the president to use force against Iraq has been
described as a unique vote of conscience, pitting liberal
against liberal, conservative against conservative.

While

that notion has some basis in fact, analysis of the Senate
vote (52-47) and the House vote (250-183), reveals familiar
political patterns.
Several key features were apparent in the voting in both

chambers.

First, the votes were highly partisan.

In both

chambers, nearly all Republicans voted to authorize the
leader of their party to use force in the crisis while the
great majority of Democrats (68 percent in the House, 82
percent in the Senate) voted against it.

Second, the votes

of Democratic members were closely related to the
partisanship of their constituencies.

Democrats representing

districts carried by Michael Dukakis in 1988 were much less
likely to support the force resolution than were Democrats
representing districts carried by Bush.
regional overtones.

Third, the votes had

Passage of the force resolution could be

attributed to the support Bush commanded among members in
both chambers from the South and from senators,
particular, from the Rocky Mountain West.

in

If the decision to

provide war authority to the president had been left to
members from the East and Midwest, the resolution would have
failed in both chambers.

Southern votes were especially

critical to the Senate outcome.

With 14 of the 22 senators

from the 11 states of the historical confederacy supporting
Bush's position, the Dixie vote was decisive.
The statistical profile of a member voting for the
resolution suggested a young, white male protestant
representing a suburban or rural district in which he had
been elected no sooner than 1980.

In other words, the

typical supporter was a typical Congressional Republican.

A

second category of typical supporter was a Southern Democrat
from a district that voted heavily for Bush in 1988.
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Leading Scorers: party Unity
Those who in 1990 most consistently voted with their party's majority against the majority of the other party:

Senate

House
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Adams

Democralll
Adams. Wash.

Gore. Tenn.
Leahy, Vt

Sarbanes, Md.
Cranston, Caln.

sasser, Tenn.
Simon, III.

])

Dodd, Conn.
Kennedy, Mess. _
Mikulski, Md.
Milchen, Maine
Moynihan, N.Y.

Evans

Symms

RepubUcans

93%
93
93
93

90
90
90
89
89
89
89
89

Symms, Idaho

Bums. Mont

Nickles, Okla.
Hatch, ·Utah
Thurmond, S.C.
Gam, Utah

. Gramm, Texas
Helms, N.C.
Wallop, Wyo.
Coats, Ind.

Hancock

Democrats

93%
92
91

89
89
88
88
88
88

87

l

Reptlblicans

97%
97
96

Evans, III.

Levin, Mich.
Hoyer. Md.
Bonior, Mich.
cardin, Md.

Gejdenson, Conn.

Hayes. III.
Kildee. Mich.
Lewis, Ga..
Moakley. Mass.
Sabo, Minn.
Studds, Mass.
Vento, Minn.
Wheat, Mo.

95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95
95

Hancock, Mo.
Armey, Texas
Burton, Ind.
Walker, Pa.
Bunning, Ky.
Dreier, calif.
Herger. cain.
Ky!. Ariz.
Dannemeyer, Calif.
Moorhead, cain.
Paxon, N.Y.

8ensenbrenner Wis.
I

98%
95
95
95
94
94
94
94

93
93
93
93

95
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Those who in 1990 most consistently voted against their party'. majority:
House

Stenholm

Democralll
Heflin, Ala --~.,
Shelby. Ala. e,,: ..
Boren. Okla.
E,xon, Neb...'

Breaux, La.
Dixon. III.

Ford, Ky.
Johnsten, La.
Baucus, Mont

Democralll

Republlcans

46%

41

34
34

31

30
30
29

28

Jeflords, Vl
Hatfield, Ore.
Cohen, Maine

Packwood, Ore.
Heinz, Pat

. Specter, Pa
Ourenberger. Minn.
Chafee, R.I.

.. .

61%
58

Stenholm, Texes
Par1<er, Miss.

46

Taylor, Miss.
Hall, Texas
Jacobs, Ind.

53
53
47

40

Hutto, Fla.

R8ptlbUcans

47%

46
44
'43

41
41

36

Conte, Mass. :-

~.71%
N.Y. .
.. :':'66 "".
MoreUa. Md." '..
'.. 65 .,:

Horton,

·Gilman. N.Y.'·
. '::63 "'~;:
Green, N,Y, .......
60 .
Schneider, R.I.· ... '·57
Smill1, N.J.
54
Boehlert N.Y.
52

"
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THE ELECTORATE EXAMINED
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In this year's elections for the House of Representatives, familiar voting tendencies of groups played themselves
out. Voting patterns for the last four off-year elections are shown below.

ICBS/NYT I
1982

Question: In the election for U.S. House of Representatives In this district, who dId you just vote for?
•

Voted for DemocratIc candidate

iJ Republican

J

Other

12%

All voters
By party

_11%

Democrat
Republican

•

1I'~~~11%

Independent

~;2%

All volo..
Byparly
Democrat

14%

Independent
By Ideology

72o/..... :l:~~~ :'","
,':i ' ,',

Liberal

Liberal

Conservative

Conservative

590/00 '

Moderate

Moderate
By sex
Men

55%

Women

56%

.
'430/Q'::-

Men

540/0--

Women

57%

By rece

By rece

White

White

53%

Black

Black

80%"

Hispanic

Hispanic

61%'

66%

Union members

Byogo

.

.

18-29,- ::

30-44

30-44

45-59

," "

\WiR]3r.

13%
I

!1%

'

44.%'" .-.:

:~.:

..,

.,

.:;
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'"
"

68%

..

,

610/.

11%

,

12%;1;i

12%

45-59
53-% •

60+

.

.

:46%..:.

i·"· _

By household Income prevlou. yeer

",.

~ ... l'"

: $10,()()(}.$15,ooo
··.2~--·

$15,OO1:~25,ooo

....'1" ." •

Over $25,000

,'f·, .

,

~12%;

12%

~I'l

$10,000-$19,999 59%

58%.
56%,

.

45%

". ',\ :'.' "" .
53:,;,.
,fa, . ~"";:.~ .

. "',

,

Note: S8mpl& .. 8.933 VOler5 as :tley left vo~ng boolI1s.
Source: Surwty by CBS News. Novemoer 7, 1978.
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By household Income previous year
Less tha'r;'$lO,OOO 70%

LesS 1Ilan $10,000

...

$20,000-$29,999
..,

.-

""

~~

12%.~ l

60+
. -:---

.~ . . .J'••

,'.

",:

,',:,

By.!'go

60%,.

18-29

•

,0

'"

By sex

UnIon household

.• ; Other

Republican

Byld80logy

-'

sa Republican

Voted for Democratic candidate

59%

$30,000.-'$50,000

46%

Ovei'$5O,OOO

36%

11%

40%

.
_

49%

,

'.'

.

.-

1 %:
4

.' .

NeJe.: Saonple me • 5.785 'o'lXers lfl OPPOSed districts as !hey lett voting booths.•• less than .5%.• ,.'
SOUrcit: SurteybyCBSNlNisINew \b'k Tmes, Novert\t)tlr 2. 1982.
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Comparing Whiles, BlackS,. and Hispanics
Compared to whites and blacks, Hispanics are more upbeat about the present course of the country, the job the
president is doing, and at least relatively, the job Congress is doing.
VOTERS

Whiles

Hispanics

Approve of
Bush's job

59%

Disapprove
Approve of
Congress's job

65%

.19%

Disapprove

77%

61%

_34%

_37%'

59%

63%

Abortion should be ...

Legal in all

_

Only some

_

circumstances

Illegal

Consider sell ...
Democrat
Republican
Independent

39%
44%

_34%
_35%

.14%

!
73%

.23%

_44%

56%'

Issues that mattered the most

•

Education

_

Crime/drugs

.21%

Iraq
Abortion
S&Ls

23%

25%

14%

73%'

15%

19%

19%

_37%

15%

_44%

50%

-_38%

.13%

16%
•

.20%

',,',

50%

"27%

_~O%.,,·

Environment

.19%

.16%

"27%

Wrong track

47%

_40%

Country on ...
Right track

_30%

_39%

13%

.16%

39%

.

"

~

......

,I'

15%
I

1

~-ti~·i

1%

,~

~·'·l
"
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In Texas

•

Dem.

.

Aep.

_~.

Ind

In Cam.

Dem.

---...'-

...... . "- i

.

J': ,..,,,'..
-._~

Aep.

Ind
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behind party as a predictor of members January 12 votes was
Of the 25 voting members of the House who are black,

race.

only freshman Gary Franks, R-Conn., voted for the resolution.
Among Hispanic and Asian Americans, the vote was nearly as
lopsided.

Of the 15 Hispanic of Asian Americans voting in

the two chambers, only three supported Bush.
If party and race are usually reliable predictors of
voting behavior, some of the elements of the January 12
division were more surprising in their effect.

Among these

were the members characteristics of age, seniority and
religion.

In the Senate, in fact, age was a huge factor.

Altogether, of the 29 senators born before 1930, only nine
voted in favor of the resolution.

And only one of the very

oldest half-dozen senators, those born before 1920, voted in
favor.

Bush's war resolution was far more popular among

younger members.

Baby boomers, those born between 1946 and

1964, supported Bush by a 3 to 2 ratio.
produce a similar pattern.

Seniority seemed to

Reluctance to authorize force

seemed to increase with seniority.

In the House, amnong the

164 members voting who had been sworn in before 1981, the
measure barely prevailed(84-80).

Conversely, among those

sworn in since 1980, Bush won backing by fat margins in both
chambers,

including a 25-19 vote of support among House

freshmen and a 3-1 vote of support among Senate freshmen.
The vote also showed notable divisions between members
along religious lines.

The most willing to back Bush were

those who identify themselves with a Protestant church.

Among Catholics, by contrast, support for the war fell

just

below 50 percent in the Senate and below 36 percent in the
House.

An even more noteable result by religion was the near

even split among Jewish members.

Bush's resolution failed

among Jewish members by a score of 16-17 in the House and 3-5
in the Senate.

This was surprising because the crisis is

generally viewed as a threat to Israel.
In all, Republican support for the president's position
could hardly have been more complete.

All but three of the

167 House Republicans (98 percent) voted for force, as did
all but two of the 44 GOP members in the Senate(95 percent).
Now that we more fully understand the magnitude of
partisanship we can begin to look at some of the factors and
values that cause it and come into play when we go to the
ballot box.
Demographics plays a very important role in
partisanship.

Let us now turn to an example of changes in

Partisanship by Demographic groups.

In the 1950's the simple

fact of being a Southerner was sufficient reason for most to
identify as Democrats; many had been born into the Democratic
party in much the same way they had been born into a given
church.

Their political identity was overwhelmingly defined

by where they lived, as opposed to who they were in terms of
religion, social status, etc.

In contrast, comparable data

from the 1980 Super Tuesday study show many significant
relationships in the new South, which now virtually match
those in the rest of the country.

The most important 1988

pattern is that of age.

The fact that citizens under 30 are

by far the most Republican whereas those over 65 are the most
Democratic should benefit the GOP for a generation to come,
as population replacement takes its toll.
Another aspect of the New Deal party system which made
little imprint on the old South was the role of social
status, as measured by either family income or education.
The Democrats in the old South were "the symbol of small
town, middle-class respectability."

Thus in the 1950's low

income and a grade school education actually decreased the
likelihood of Democratic identification among white
southerners in the 1950's.
As the South industrialized socioeconomic patterns of
partisanship came to resemble those of the North.

16 percent

of white southerners who belonged to a union household in the
1950's were slightly more likely to be Democrats.

By 1988

this unionized group had declined to 9 percent, but the
difference in partisanship compared to the rest of the
population had increased greatly.

As the South has moved

beyond industrialization to high technology,

increasing

education and income levels have substantially contributed to
the GOP gains.

The middle and upper middle income categories

are now major sources of Republican strength.

As grade

school educated citizens have dwindled, this aging remnant of
the old South has gone from the least to the most Democratic
of the education categories.

In contrast, among college

graduates a 54 percent advantage for the Democrats in the

1950's has been transformed into a 31 percent edge for the
Republicans in 1988.

This example of the Southern states is

a clear indication of the power that Partisanship plays on
voting behavior and party affiliation.

Further, this example

clearly illustrates that those individuals who are young,
well educated and have money identify more closely with the
Republican party.

Now let us turn to another example of

Partisan shifts which is a little closer to home.
Illinois is a classic example of split-level politics.
The Democrats have not carried Illinois in a presidential
election since 1964.

And they have'nt won a contest for

governor since 1972.

Yet Democrats occupy both U.S. Senate

seats and have held a majority of House seats since 1982.
Democrats took control of both state legislative houses in
1974 and have held them for all but two years since.
Realignment shows up most clearly in Chicago.

White

ethnics are less Democratic than they used to be, while
blacks and liberals are more Democratic.

Blacks in Illinois

went from about three-quarters Democratic in the 1950's to
over 90 percent in the decades since.

Chicago's white ethnic

voters have moved in the opposite direction.

Their support

for the Democratic ticket dropped to 50 percent in the
1960's, rose in the 1970's, then collapsed during the Reagan
years.

These are the White Democratic "regulars" who gave

John Kennedy 62 percent of their vote.

They gave Walter

Mondale 37 percent, and Michael Dukakis 44 percent, thus
costing him Illinois.

The "lakefront liberal"

vote-educated, upper-middle

class whites on the north side moved in the opposite
direction.

Lakefront liberals and white ethnics clash over

cultural politics.

Like blacks, white liberals became more

Democratic in the 1960's as white ethnics became less
Democratic.

In the 1970's the Democrats picked up support

from white ethnics and lost ground among lakefront liberals.
The return of cultural politics in the 1980's brought
educated liberals back to the Democratic party and drove
white ethnics away.

Chicago's growing hispanic vote now

holds the balance of power in city elections.
more like blacks than like white ethnics.

Hispanics vote

But the trend in

the hispanic vote during the 1980's is like that of white
ethnics- anti Democratic.
One reason why realignment seems to be a Chicago
phenomenon is Chicago's recent history of racial politics.
In his two mayoral victories (1983 and 1987), Harold
Washington took almost all of the black vote but less than 10
percent of the white ethnic vote.

Nevertheless, the

polarization of Chicago politics began long before the
1980's.

It started with the cultural clashes of the 1960's.

Even while Richard J. Daley held the Democratic organization
vote together in mayoral elections, racial and ideological
divisions were becoming stronger in national and state
voting.

The downstate voters were unaffected by realignment,

consistently voting in the low 40s for Democratic
presidential tickets,

in the high 40s for statewide

Democrats.

Similarly, suburban whites have voted in the low

30s for presidential Democrats,

in the high 30s for statewide

Democrats.
But that continuity disguises important demographic
shifts.

Illinois is divided into 3 geographic components:

Chicago, the suburbs, and downstate.

During the 1950's,

Chicago accounted for about 40 percent of the Illinois vote.
Today,

it is 25 percent.

The suburban share of the vote has

mushroomed from 22 to 36 percent.

The downstate vote has

remained stable while Chicago's percentage of the state total
vote has gotten smaller, it has also gotten more Democratic
(from 60 percent Democratic in the 1950's to about 70 percent
today).

While the Republican vote in the suburbs has

remained stable <about 60 percent), that vote has more weight
today.

These two changes have altered Illinois' politics.

By the 1960's, the suburban vote offset the Chicago vote
with equal numbers of voters.

Chicago voted 63 percent

Democratic, the suburbs 61 percent Republican.

Downstate

Illinois cast the swing vote-usually narrowly Republican.

By

the 1980's, the suburban vote was much larger than the
Chicago vote.

Even though Democrats regularly come out of

Chicago these days with a 400,000 vote edge, they can get
swamped in the suburbs-which is what happens in presidential
elections.
In sum, realignment has solidified a liberal Democratic
base in Chicago.

Realignment has also swelled the size of

the Republican vote in the suburbs.

White ethnics did not

just move out of the Democratic party.

They also moved out

of the city, and ended up voting just as Republican as their
neighbors.

It used to be the case that Republicans carried

Illinois by cutting into the big Chicago vote.

Now Democrats

carry Illinois by cutting into the big suburban and downstate
vote.

We have talked thus far about Partisanship and how

changes in Partisanship effect voting behavior.

What I would

like to do now is move our focus to some of the different
factors that come into play when we go to the ballot box and
discuss why they are a driving force in determining why some
people vote and others do not.
The central finding of survey-level studies of
contemporary American voter turnout is that formal education
is the most powerful predictor of voting.

The more education

a person has, the more likely he is to vote.

This finding

results from national studies; however, virtually no research
has been conducted to determine whether this pattern of
participation exists within the individual states.
There is good reason to expect that the pattern of voter
participation many well vary from one state to the next.

An

examination of the "theory" of voter participation implicit
in much of the research on American voter turnout suggests
the basis for this expectation.

According to this theory, an

individual is likely to vote if the motivation to vote
exceeds the obstacles to voting.
be internal or external.

Sources of motivation may

"Internal'· sources of motivation

include such attitudes as partisan identification, "political

j
Gender and Education Comp~risons~~~;~fr'
Women who went to the polls were less likely to approve of the job the president is doing and more negative
about the country's direction than men who turned out. Those with the least and those with the most formal
education tend to differ on a wide range of issues.
VOTERS
Approve of
Bush's job

Men

Oisappro~e

_36%

Approve of
Congress's job

•

Women

SomeH.S.

_37%

53%

58%

_40%

17%

.17%

Disapprove

73%

70%

76%

80%

Abortion should be ...
Legal in all

circumstances

Only some
Illegal
Consider sell ...
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Ideology
..:::;

"::"':.

r:.l .';
" ....

Uberal
Conservative
Moderate

.;~t.> Country on ...
~/'

',;"

. Right track

?-.' . Wrong track

_

_

38%

_

_41%

46%

_39%

..

32%

_34%'"

_37%

_34%

46%

.23%

_35%

"'29%
_30%

_31%

_27%"

i

.22%

.20%

.,7%

_35%

"28%

_35%

_'\1%

_46%

_38%

18%

53%

.9%

_46%

.15%

.,4%

•

.23%

_26%

_41%

~.

_47%"

..'.",-".-.

"

_42%
51%

_32%

.23%
_31%
.22%
15%

..:

.19%

57%

61%

.'"'29%
9% ,..", .
.14%

14%

111%

-'"""';i- -

1

13%

4%
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efficacy",

Ilsense of civic duty", and Il po litical

trust

ll

•

The

strong association between such attitudes and voting was
established in the early voting studies and has been
frequently confirmed.
electoral activities,

l'External"

sources of motivation are

i.e., the voter registration and get

out and vote efforts of candidates, parties, and other
organizations.

That electoral activities can foster

participation has been attested to in a variety of research
contexts.

Survey research at various levels of elections has

shown that persons contacted by candidate and party
volunteers are more likely to vote than persons not
contacted.

County and precinct studies have demonstrated

that the mobilization efforts of candidates and party
organizations can stimulate turnout.

Recent studies also

indicate that campaign spending levels, utilized as
indicators of electoral mobilization effort, are positively
associated with turnout levels in state and congressional
elections.

Finally, several authors have concluded that

electoral or party competition, seen as a stimulus to
electoral activity, fosters voter participation.
The primary obstacles to voting are voter registration
laws, which evidence suggests are best viewed as barriers
citizens must overcome in order to vote.

Comparitive,

historical, and cross-sectional studies have reached this
conclusion.

Comparitive researchers have found that low

turnout rates in the United States, relative to Western
Europe, can be explained at least partially in terms of

American State registration requirements.

Research has

demonstrated that the introduction of personal registration
laws around the turn of the century clearly had a depressing
effect on turnout levels.

Turnout studies have consistently

found that restrictive registration laws lower voter turnout
rates.

Researchers have concluded that voter registration

laws are particularly severe obstacles to voting for persons
with little or no formal education.

Given the unequal

effects of registration laws as obstacles to voting and the
variation in state registration laws,

it follows that one

would expect the turnout gap between the more educated and
the less educated to be greater in states with more
restrictive registration laws than states with less
restrictive laws.
A quite different theory which deals with why people do
and do not vote is the amount of integration into community
life each voter has.

More precisely, this theory holds that

voting participation, beyond all other factors, will be
higher among persons who are more fully integrated into their
communities, finding satisfaction in the community life.
The direction of the vote - Republican or Democratic
can be explained as a seeking of benefits, however general.
In this sense, voting does appear to be rational, a logical
consequence of partisan loyalties, of issue preferences, and
of candidate evaluation.

The costs of making a correct

choice are sensibly reduced when voters use cues such as
partisanahip.

When deciding whether to vote at all, however, voters
are more likely to emphasize costs that are immediate (time,
obtaining information, finding the polling place, etc.),
while the benefits are distant at best.

The chance that one

vote will make a difference is so astronomical that it cannot
be worth the effort on purely rational grounds of costs and
benefits.

Indeed, on this basis,

it is difficult to

understand why anyone would vote at all in an election larger
than a rural high school contest.
For the current study, five individual attitudes were
examined: strwength of partisanship, external efficacy,
internal efficacy,
duty.

interest in the campaign, and citizen

It stands to reason that people are more likely to

vote if they are strongly committed to a political party,

if

they find the world of politics responsive, understandable,
and interesting, and if they accept the conventional cicic
obligation to vote.

All of these attitudes showed

consistent, though varied, relationships to turnout in the
elections of 1984 and 1988.

These attitudes were also found

to be helpful in explaining a notable decline in strong
partisanship during this period, as well as a decided decline
in external efficacy and a possible decline in citizen duty.
Measuring the impact of two of these factors partisanship and external efficacy - Ruy Teixeira found that
they accounted for 38 percent of the drop in turnout from
1960 to 1980.

Conversely, he found these two factors

accounted for 46 percent of the increase in turnout between

1980 to 1984.

Still, the puzzle is not completely solved.

We need to look beyond these individualistic causes.
explanations, however,

These

leave something out; they leave out

the local flavor of an election and its social character.
Urban machines brought voters to the polls not only
because voters were paid for their ballots, but because
voting was an expression of the voters integration into a
local, typically ethnic, network of personal associations.

A

noted political scientist, George Washington Plunkitt,
illustrated the connection between political participation,
in this case in Fourth of July celebrations and community
identity.

"When the Fourth of July comes,

the reformers,

with Revolutionary names parted in the middle, run off to
Newport or the Adirondacks to get out of the way of the noise
and everything that reminds them of the glorious day.
different it is with Tammany!

How

The very constitution of the

Tammany Society requires that we must assemble at the wigwam
on the Fourth, regardless of the weather, and listen to the
reading of the Declaration of Independence and patriotic
speeches" .

The focus of this theory is the integration of voters
into their communities.

This integration is achieved as

close face to face relationships in three contexts: the
family,

the residential community, and peer groups.

Family,

residence, and group affiliations are viewed as different
aspects of the social correctedness of individuals, as some
of the ways in which they separate themselves from the

"lonely crowd", and become part of active political networks.
To test the relationship of community integration to
turnout, eight variables that provide reasonably appropriate
measures of integration into individuals immediate social
surroundings, and of their committment to their communities.
In contrast to psychological attitudes, we will deal here
with actual behavior.

The first variable - being married

represents a personal committment to the small community of
the family.

This theory expects a higher turnout among

married people.

A similar committment would be evidenced by

raising children.
Three other variables represent committment to the
residential community.

We should expect higher turnout among

persons who own, rather than rent, their homes; and who have
lived longer in their current home.

The final four variables

represent committment to group communities.

We should expect

higher turnout among persons who are more frequent
churchgoers; who come from families with union members; who
discuss politics frequently; and who belong to or take part
in formal organizations of those people to whom they feel
closest.

For example, a religious group for those who feel

closest to their coreligionsists.
Changes in the distribution of these characteristics
among the national population can help explain the decline in
national turnout.

Teixeira, the leading analyst of these

changes, points to the significant increase in unmarried
adults and in residential mobility among Americans as major
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Exit pollsters gave voters a list of groups and asked if they identified with them. Three are shown below. Using this approach, we can examine groups whose numbers are usually too small for analysis. Self-described gays and lesbians,
for example, are pessimistic about the country's direction, anti-Bush, and strongly Republican,
Attend religious services at least
once a month

VOTERS
Approve of

49%

63%

Bush's job

Disapprove

_34%

Approve of
Congress's job

.19%

_20%

Disapprove

GayS/Lesbians

Labor union members

_20%

49%

78%

.15%

76%

75%

43%

Abortion should be '"
Legal in all

circumstances

_

43%

27%

_21%

Illegal

42%

50%

Only some

.13%

Consider sell ",

Democrat

I

39%

Republican
Independent

48%

_33%

_23%
_29%
_28%

Ideology

.15~

Conservative

_38%
45%

Moderate

51%

_21%

_25%

liberal

_27%

.18%

74%

~~'o
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Country on ...
Right track

.19%
54%

Wrong track

81%

Issues that mattered the most

Environment
Education
Crime/drugs

_23%
_20%

_28%

Iraq'

.7%

Abortion

.18%
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68%
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Hoe.: VOters were asked, 'Are you any ollhe fOllowing (check as many u apply): first time voter, retired, married. currentfy employed, member 01 a labor union. attend religious services 811easl: orcs a month.
streng feminist, have an immediate family member in the armed 1orc:esIreserve. gay or lesbian?'
.- ::-::--:"" i~-:-:-_.-; -7'···'·~·· '"

SourcI: Survey by Voter Research and $urveys.Novemtler ~ 1990.'...

factors, accounting for almost 18 percent of the drop in
voting participation.

It is clearly evident that community

integration has a definite impact on voter turnout.
Through the course of this essay I have identified
numerous theories, values, and ideals which relate strongly
to voter participation in the electorate.

I have studied the

principles of partisanship and socialization, and through
specific case studies proved that they have a controlling
influence on voting behavior.

Finally,

I have analyzed a

number of shifts in partisanship and voting behavior and
shown how this effects the overall makeup of the electorate.
I feel that because of my intensive study, my grasp of the
different agents which effect political participation is much
firmer.
likewise.

It is my genuine concern that the reader feels

•

